Concepts of Democracy and
Democratization
Introduction
As
Chandran Kukathas puts it: “We live in an age of democracy fetishism” and
“global political phenomenon of ‘democratization.” During the Cold War, the
United States and its Western allies paraded democracy globally as a means to
contain communism, even if quite frequently they embraced autocratic
(undemocratic) regimes in Africa. Western governments and media also turned a
blind eye to human rights violations by regimes such as Zaire, Kenya, and
Sudan, which supported or claimed to support the West. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the concomitant demise of communism in 1990, however, a spirit
of triumphalism swept through the West. The euphoric impression was as if
“history had finally ended with the universal victory of Western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government.” The post–Cold War era,
therefore, offered the West, especially the United States, a unique historical
opportunity to impose its political and economic values across the globe with
Africa as a prime target. Western democracy and democratization became the
precondition for African countries that sought foreign aid and loans, especially
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in order to
redress their dire politico-economic crises. This “marriage of economic
‘perestroika’ and political ‘glasnost,’” as Paul Zeleza describes it, “seemed
so radical, so new” in the emergent world order.
The
critical dynamic for democratization, as Richard Joseph points out, involves
the “domination of the world economy by the market-oriented economies, the
geostrategic hegemony of western industrialized nations, and direct or indirect
external pressures for democratization.”6 On the other hand, the end of the
Cold War “opened up domestic spaces for democratic politics in many African
countries” and the implementation of the “iron fisted structural adjustment” of
the donor agencies provoked popular resistance and democratic movements.7
Realizing that regimes they had previously backed were standing on shaky
ground, the West and its donor agencies had to make sharp turns in their
policies to curry favor with the new democratic movements. Thus, the role of
Africans in pushing for democratization based on their local conditions, a
phenomenon they referred to as the “second independence,” should not be
overlooked in any analysis.
After
a brief appraisal of the definitions and practice of liberal democracy, this
paper focuses on the conceptual and contextual notions of democracy and
democratization in reference to Africa. First, it demonstrates that the
principles of democracy and democratic values are neither novel nor alien but
rather indigenous to the African continent. It exposes the politics behind the
deliberate elision of the African indigenous concepts and practices by Western
thinkers and policy makers since the colonial era. Second, this study attempts
to show that efforts by the United States and other Western countries to
“export” democracy (or dictatorship) to Africa and to promote (or undermine)
democratization are contingent on their interests as dictated by epochal
phenomena such as colonialism, Cold War, neocolonialism, and globalization. The
focus on these two major questions should not be seen as unmindful of the
sustained pressures by African pro-democracy and human rights movements, a
momentum hijacked by the West and its agencies in furthering their own
interests. Although critical of democratization as a process, this study should
be construed neither as a critique of democracy nor as a defense of it; it is
also not a balance sheet on the success or failure of the democratization
process in Africa.
The “White Man’s Burden”?
Discourses
on democracy and democratization in Africa are usually presented in the West as
though they are entirely new notions and practices to Africans. The idea of
democracy itself is viewed almost exclusively as a Western concept of which
African societies now stand desperately in need. Similarly, the presumption has
been that democratic values and practices are alien to the African continent,
with the West posturing as their cultural bearers and defenders. This mindset
considers Africans as incapable of democratic thoughts and hence they should be
infused with the “civilized” notion of Western democracy. What has been
consistently ignored is that democratic values and processes have been as
indigenous to Africans as they were to the ancient Greeks. African traditional
political cultures and organizations would give credence to this conclusion.
While the term democracy, now a Western buzzword for representative government,
might have been borrowed from the Greeks, democratic thought and values have
never been exclusively Greek or Euro-American preserve. Indeed, the desire for
representation, inclusion, and participation in public affairs—essential
elements of democracy—are universal to all humans; the difference rests in the
methods of attaining these goals. To what extent a society “democratizes” is
incontestably dependent on its sociocultural milieu, whether it is African,
European, American, Asian, or even Islamic societies.
Efforts
by the West to “introduce” democracy to Africa bear close semblance to the concept
of the “civilizing mission” trumpeted by Europeans during the era of
colonialism in the nineteenth century. In his now infamous poem “The White
Man’s Burden,” Rudyard Kipling considers European colonization of Africa as a
blessing to Africans but a huge burden for Europeans. Europeans sought to bring
civilization to Africans, whom Kipling saw as a degenerate race, incapable of
development and civilized behavior.8 And, European cultural benchmarks were
used in determining what civilization entailed, and who was or was not
civilized. Since Europeans were themselves the judges, a civilized culture
(whether social, political, or economic) was that which approximated the
European model. Furthermore, since colonialism justified and legitimized itself
on the assumption of the superiority of the white race (Europeans) over blacks
(Africans), it became quite logical for European colonizers to discredit the
existing culture of the colonized Africans no matter how comparable they both
were.
Consequently,
African societies (including their indigenous democratic values) that were not
necessarily “civilized” to the European mindset were portrayed as barbarous
and, therefore, stood in need of “civilization.” It was a unique union between
cultural arrogance and dubious altruism. Thus, in reality, the supposed burden
was an effort to replicate or reproduce European models and values in
Africa—another form of neocolonialism so to speak. It was all about Western
hegemony. The current obsession for Western democracy, democratization and
globalization in Africa is, then, déjà vu. Reminiscent of European motives or
justifications for colonialism, the current push for democratization has little
to do with the selfless notion of the “civilizing mission.” Instead, the
interests and well-being of the African peoples have been subordinated to those
of the industrialized countries of the West.
Since
the classical times, democracy has been neither a linear nor a monolithic
concept. As the meaning of democracy shifted in time and space, so has its
actual practice. In her response to the U.S. House Sub-Committee on Africa over
charges of tardiness in the democratization process in Africa in 1999, Vivian
Lowery Derryck, an assistant administrator for Africa, USAID, noted: “we have
learned that there is really no uniform model of democracy. To function
effectively, a democratic system should reflect the unique needs and culture of
a given country.”9 The subcommittee was not amused, especially when the
official position favored the wholesale transplantation of the American style
of democracy to Africa. Yet pervasive in all democracies is the basic concept
of popular participation in government by the citizenry.
Before
European contact and subsequent colonialism, Africans practiced some variants
of democracy alongside authoritarian rule. However, European colonialism
undermined the traditional participatory democratic system for almost one
hundred years, only to revive it on the eve of decolonization in the form of a
parliamentary system. Similarly, the West undermined both the indigenous and
postcolonial democratic efforts in order to contain Soviet influence during the
Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of a unipolar world and
the beginning of the era of globalization, there is a renewed emphasis on
democracy and democratization. It is quite auspicious to ask: what does the
West desire for Africa? Democracy! What type of democracy and for whose
benefit? As with Kipling’s justification for European colonialism, would it be
out of place to assume that democratization would be another “burden” for the
West?
Concepts and Practices
Before
dealing with the issue of whether, in theory and practice, democracy existed in
pre-colonial Africa, it is quite appropriate here to attempt to correlate the
origins and meanings of the Western notion of democracy. Ancient Greece (Athens
in particular) is widely regarded as the birthplace of Western democracy and
political thought, and the word democracy was coined from the Greek words
demos, “the people,” and kratia, “to rule.” In theory, this was rule by the
people for the people as opposed to rule by one (autocracy) or a few
(oligarchy), a form of direct democracy in which all citizens could speak and
vote in assembly. In practice, Athenian democracy did not extend equality and
franchise to all persons and therefore allowed direct participation only by
male citizens, a small political elite, to the exclusion of the majority of the
populace consisting of women, slaves, and foreign residents. Greek democracy
did not really encompass most of the key elements of modern democracy—equality
of all persons before the law and franchise for all. Thus, in reality, direct
participation in government by the privileged few constituted the thrust of
Athenian democracy. Limited as Athenian democracy was, the West still draws
inspirations from it.
Since
Roman times, the meaning of democracy has continually shifted, producing many
variants. Democracy is now a relative concept; it no longer means the same
thing to all peoples and cultures at all times. The ancient Romans took a
practical approach to everything, including the principle of democracy. The
social conditions and divisions that existed within their community determined
the political institutions the Romans adopted and, therefore, they “did not
concern themselves with the construction of an ideal government, but instead
fashioned political institutions in response to problems as they arose.” Thus,
the democracy of the Roman republic differed from that of the empire with the
role of the senators in government constantly changing from one era to another.
In England, the principle and practice of democracy also took on a different
form.
The
British Parliament evolved in the late thirteenth century as representative
government with a hereditary monarchy, though the former was answerable to the
latter. With the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the resultant Bill of Rights,
constitutional monarchy coexisted with representative authority of Parliament. Yet
as capricious as these models appear, ancient Rome provided the West with a
fine model just as England is still considered as an ideal variant of democracy
in the Western conception of the term.
While
it is incontestable that Athenian democracy remains a fundamental inspiration
for modern Western political thought, it seems rather naïve to continue to
ascribe all notions of participatory democracy to that single source. After
all, recent historical and archaeological research suggests that some of the
key elements of democracy are traceable to older civilizations such as
Mesopotamia, where city-states predated those of the Greeks. In pre-colonial
Africa, variants of the concepts of participatory or representative government
(democracy?) evolved independent of the Athenian tradition and survived until
the European invasion of Africa in the nineteenth century.
In
modern times, however, there is no acceptable clinical or scientific definition
of liberal democracy although “the main features are free competition among
political parties, periodic elections, and respect for the fundamental freedom
of thought, expression, and assembly.” Tony Smith defines democracy as “free
elections contested by freely organized parties under universal suffrage for
control of the effective centers of governmental power.” However, the above
definitions are based on the Western concept of liberal democracy and they
reflect an Anglo-American cultural bias. They reduce the concept of democracy
to elections, multiparty system, and universal suffrage such that any deviation
becomes an aberration. In the West, political parties form along different
class interests or organized groups, whereas in Africa there was the
near-absence of established classes before European colonial intrusion. Thus,
contemporary Western insistence on multiparty politics does not consider
indigenous cultural values and consequently multiparty electoral politics
degenerates into ethnic or communal conflicts. Democracy would then simply
become an instrument of political dissension and chaos. Although more research
is needed, however, it would not be surprising if the wholesale adoption of
multiparty democracy turns out to be one of the major causes of the current
political crises in Africa.
This
“dominant way of characterizing democracy according to a set of electoralist,
institutionalist, and proceduralist criteria, Richard Joseph argues, must be
expanded into a broader conceptualization.” On this point Makinda proposes that
democracy should be conceived “as a way of government firmly rooted in the
belief that people in any society should be free to determine their political,
economic, social, and cultural systems. But the form it takes can vary
according to the particular circumstances of any society.” A broader concept of
democracy should include what David Maillu refers to as “cultural definition of
democracy” in which African democracy, “like philosophy, had to be lived,
theories left aside.” For him, African societies were socially and politically
structured so that “everybody participated according to his ability,
ages-status, and wishes . . . everybody was invited to offer the cooking of his
mind.” African democracy, therefore, transcended the realm of politics; it
constituted an integral part of the peoples’ culture, which allowed everyone a
sense of belonging. It was a “practical democracy as opposed to theoretical
democracy,” which required people to be more sensitive and responsible for
their neighbors’ well-being. This is not to say that there was a total absence
of social stratification based on wealth and age. Certainly there were
commoners as well and offenders were stigmatized because they violated or
trampled on others’ rights or well-being.
It
is still debated whether democracy connotes a form of popular power (politics)
in which citizens engage in self-government and self-regulation or is simply an
aid to decision making in the form of conferment of authority on select
individuals. David Held isolated three basic variants of democracy, namely,
direct or participatory democracy, liberal or representative democracy, and
one-party democracy. While participatory democracy, the “original” type of
democracy as used by ancient Athens and others, involved all citizens in
decision making about public affairs, representative democracy involved elected
officials who undertook to represent the interests of citizens within specific
territories. One-party democracy, however, although framed as representative
democracy, shunned multiparty competition. Held further shows how Marxist critics
attacked liberal democracy and its capitalist economy that “inevitably produces
systematic inequality and massive restrictions on real freedom.”
Although
it is widely believed to be the ideal system government, Schweller has
cautioned, “Democracy is not always or even necessarily a recipe for “‘good’
societal decisions or the creation of ideal communities. The extension of
democracy is not, therefore, an automatic gain for humankind.” Not
surprisingly, the most “perfect” popular democracies in the West, including
those of the United States and Britain, have some serious flaws. For Robert
Dahl, “in practice democratic systems have always fallen considerably short of
the criteria and values that justify democracy” and as Danilo Zolo pointed out,
there is no genuine competition between points of view; most political
negotiations are done behind the scenes, not visible to the average voters; and
the rise of mass media has diminished debate among citizens. Thus, it is no
longer in doubt that representative democracy does not work as well as the
concept would have one believe. This, according to Kate Nash, is exemplified in
the “declining numbers of voters who participate in national elections in
countries where voting is not obligatory, the increase in the volatility of
party political allegiances, and the rapidity with which media-led issues come
to prominence and are just as quickly forgotten.” Furthermore, the Western
public “is generally seen to be apathetic, cynical and unstable.”
In
the United States and other Western countries, the nagging question continues
to revolve around the extent of participation in government by the citizenry.
Voter turnout is usually low, representatives pursue their personal agenda, and
government has become more interested in protecting big business interests than
those of the ordinary citizens. Thus, on the one hand, “democracy is
celebrated; on the other hand, there is growing concern about how it works in
practice.” Clearly, a better notion of democracy would have to follow Adam
Przeworski’s definition, which sees democracy as “a system of ruled
open-endedness, or organized uncertainty.”
Indigenous African Democracies
Keeping
in mind the Athenian style, let us consider the concepts and practice of
indigenous democracies in many African societies. “Three heads are better than
one” is a well-known maxim in Africa. Implicit in this adage are notions of
democratic values and tradition predicated on people’s participation. Several
researchers have shown that in the period preceding colonial rule, Africans
experimented with a variety of political organizations ranging from direct and
representative democracy to various forms of monarchical and decentralized
systems. Many African indigenous governments were open and inclusive. Fortes
and Evans-Pritchard pointed out that “the structure of an African state implies
that kings and chiefs rule by consent” and that “ruler’s subjects are as fully
aware of the duties he owes to them, as they are of the duties they owe to him,
and are able to exert pressure to make him discharge these duties.” Similarly,
Ayittey has observed that in traditional African political arrangement, “No one
was locked out of the decision-making process. One did not have to belong to
one political party or family to participate in the process; even foreigners
were allowed to participate.” Recalling with nostalgia the virtues of the
African indigenous political organization in the face of current leadership
crisis, Ayittey has called for a return to that system. Although Ayittey’s
position is somewhat extreme (since political cultures are never static), he
demonstrates clearly that traditional African societies were not devoid of
democratic ideals.
The
indigenous political system of the Igbo of southeastern Nigeria presents one of
the most elaborate examples of direct and participatory democracy in
traditional Africa. Apart from a few centralized polities such as Nri, Onitsha,
Oguta, and Osomari that were monarchical systems, the Igbo operated as
decentralized political organization. Although most Igbo political groups
possessed no sole authority (paramount ruler), they “lacked no essential norms
of government.” For our present purpose, Victor Uchendu isolated two layers of
political structure among the Igbo: the village and the village-group. The
villages varied in size and population, and “Government at the village level is
an exercise in direct democracy.” During general assembly, at this level, every
male adult directly participated in the legislative and decision-making process
pertaining to public affairs.
Uchendu
presents a detailed account of how Igbo village democracy operated. This
general assembly consisting of adult males is known as the Ama-ala or Oha, and
the assembly ground may be in an open square as was the case in the earlier
(pre-colonial and colonial era) or a permanent village hall as in the modern
time. During this gathering, public matters are brought up and every male
attendee who wants to contribute to the debate (discussion) is entitled to a
hearing. After thoroughly discussing the matter, the leaders from each lineage
within the village retire for izuzu (consultation). Participation in izuzu is
highly imperative and treasured; it is restricted to men of substance, wit, and
prestige who possess the wisdom to analyze all strands of thought and suggest a
compromise that the Ama-ala would accept. After the izuzu, a spokesman is
selected, based on his “power of oratory, persuasive talents, and his ability
to put the verdict in perspective,” to announce the verdict. This decision is
either accepted by the Ama-ala by general acclamation or rejected outright, and
in the event of the latter, the view of the assembly prevails by popular
assent.
Women
have their own assemblies, which follow the male pattern. This is because
African social and political structure has never been a matter of men alone.
The very powerful political roles of African queens and queen mothers in the
precolonial era remain very instructive. European colonial officials and
contemporary Western writers usually portrayed African women as having no role
in political affairs. For Maillu, this erroneous notion about African women
exhibited European “cultural male chauvinism” that was carried over to Africa. Nevertheless,
like ancient Greeks, the village system was analogous to the city-states as
each village was “autonomous and ‘sovereign’ in most matters affecting it” and
tolerated no interference or dictation from any other group. At the
village-group level, consisting of several villages, a representative system
(more in the nature of modern representative democracy) evolved whereby each
village elected or appointed its own delegate to the village-group assembly. At
all levels, the common denominators were consultation, participation, and
consensus as evidenced in Chinua Achebe’s novel, Things Fall Apart.
In
the Igbo village of Umuofia depicted in this novel, Achebe demonstrates the
consultative and consensual nature of village politics and decision-making
process. A neighboring village, Mbaino, murdered a daughter of Umuofia, and a
village assembly urgently convened to decide on an appropriate line of action.
After some deliberation, they decided to give Mbaino an ultimatum, “to choose
between war on the one hand, and on the other the offer of a young man and a
virgin as compensation.” In another scenario in Things Fall Apart, the Umuofia
assembly decided to collect the sum of fifty bags of cowries to appease “the
white man” who arrested six of their elders as part of an European effort to
complete the colonial enclosure. Clearly, the Igbo system was a democracy that
evolved independently and indigenously, a clear indication that democratic
principle, whether ancient or modern, are not alien to Africans; they are
rooted in the people’s indigenous tradition and values.
The
pre-colonial political structure of Gikuyu (Kikuyu) of modern Kenya represents
another example of direct and participatory democracy. Among the Gikuyu (Kikuyu
people), as among the Igbo, there was no sole (paramount) ruler; eligible
adults constituted the legislative assembly. “In the eyes of the Gikuyu
people,” Jomo Kenyatta asserted, “the submission to a despotic rule of any
particular man or group, white or black, is the greatest humiliation to
mankind.” The origins of Gikuyu democracy are embodied in their
historical-political legend. According to this legend, a despotic monarch who
was ultimately overthrown by the people initially ruled Gikuyuland. After his
overthrow, “the government of the country was at once changed from despotism to
a democracy which was in keeping with the wishes of the majority of the
people.” This popular revolution is known as itwika, derived from the twika,
which “signified the breaking away from autocracy to democracy.” Although
Kenyatta’s conclusion appears to coincide with the nationalist spirit and
slogan of his time, there is little doubt that the Gikuyu loathed the notion of
one-man dictatorship. Undoubtedly, “[t]he Gikuyu government prior to the advent
of the Europeans was based on true democratic principles.”
“Government
among the Kikuyu units (villages) was “vested in the elders of one generation”
or age-set known as riika (plural, mariika). Usually, the accession to power of
a new generation takes place at recurring intervals, inaugurated by the handing
over ceremony known as ituiko. The determination of the period of a generation
was contingent on the composition of society at the time. However, generally,
once most of the firstborn grandsons of the ruling generation are circumcised,
the generation prepares to relinquish power to the next generation. Normally
the gap between two official generations is much the same as the gap between
the average ages of a man and his firstborn son. Essentially, circumcision was
the only qualification, and it conferred recognition of manhood and the full
right of citizenship. Legislative duties were reposed in the senior rank of the
elders’ lodge representing the various constituent villages. The body empowered
to legislate for a village group is, in theory, the elders of the ruling set,
but in practice only in liaison with members of the other age-set. Consultation,
representation, and consensus, as in the Igbo system, were the main features of
Kikuyu indigenous political system; “it was the voice of the people or public
opinion that ruled the country.”
In
some African societies, democratic systems took the form of representative
(“constitutional”) monarchies almost approximating the English style, with
well-crafted mechanisms of checks and balances. In these systems, society and
government were more centralized and the power of the monarch limited by
representative bodies or agencies. The Oyo Empire, which flourished in
southwestern Nigeria from 1600 to1860, provides a classic example of this
system. At the head of the Oyo Empire was the Alafin (emperor) who was the most
important figure in the political system. Although, in theory, the Alafin’s
power was absolute, in practice, another organ, the Oyomesi, limited his power.
Furthermore, the need to retain public confidence and loyalty delimited the
king’s exercise of absolute power. The Oyomesi served as a representative
council of state consisting of seven members from each of the seven wards that
made up the empire. Collectively, they were the kingmakers, and they commanded
the imperial army with Bashorun, one of its members, as the commander-in-chief.
Under a rigid system of checks and balances, the power of the Alafin was held
in constant check by the Oyomesi. Another body, the Ogboni, made up of freemen
of integrity, age, and experience and appointed by the Alafin with Oyomesi’s
approval, in turn, regulated the authority of Oyomesi. Although the Oyo system
differed from the Igbo structure of direct democracy, it would be naïve to
assume that there was absence of democratic values in the Oyo Empire. The
Oyomesi blunted the powers of what could have otherwise degenerated into a
one-man dictatorship.
The
Buganda Kingdom of Uganda presents another good example of an “absolute king”
whose powers were checked by parliament. While the Kabaka (the king) was, in
principle, supreme, he ruled the kingdom in conjunction with a prime minister
(katikkiro) and a parliament (lukiiko). Members of parliament were made up of
the chiefs of outlying districts that comprised the kingdom. Although in theory
the kabaka was not bound to take the advice of the katikkiro and the lukiiko,
in practice he could not afford to ignore them. Kiwanuka pointed out how Kabaka
Mutesa “learned to consult his chiefs on questions of great national importance
such as war and peace and which religion to adopt.” The katikkiro could condone
or even instigate plots against the king through other ambitious princes. After
all, the kabaka did not become king through an automatic succession
arrangement, as one would expect in a monarchy. Instead, he was elected from
among a number of competing princes who equally had legitimate claims to the
throne. Even when a reigning kabaka picked a possible successor, it was not
binding because the prince so preferred had to meet the necessary criteria for
enthronement as adjudged by the kingmakers.
Although
the political system of Buganda was based on kingship, it was apparently a
representative monarchy in which parliament and the prime minister not only
ensured representation according to the concept of modern democracy but also
limited the powers of the king to avoid tyranny. Commentators on African
indigenous systems usually ignore these in-built democratic values of
representation and checks and balances that forestalled tyranny as well as
ensured the participation of the people in government. While the Buganda system
might easily be dismissed as undemocratic by Western political theorists, they
would have no qualms in applauding the British monarchical structure as an
ideal form of democracy. The reasons for this premeditated contradiction and
hypocrisy can be placed squarely on the concept of the civilizing mission, the
white man’s burden, and the argumentation put forward in the subsequent
session.
Colonial Dictatorship
With
the foregoing case studies, it is clear that before European invasion and
colonization, variants of indigenous democracy—direct and participatory
democracies and representative monarchies—existed in Africa. European colonial
occupation and the resultant colonial rule disrupted these political systems.
Since colonialism was justified by scientific racism, the superiority of whites
over blacks, Europeans mystified themselves in the eyes of Africans through
force and outright condemnation. African culture and innovation were
systematically debased whether or not they approximated European ways. As Franz
Fanon affirmed, “[t]he native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents
not only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. . . . He is
the corrosive element destroying all that comes near him . . . ; he is the
depository of maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable instrument
of blind forces.”
The
establishment of colonial rule witnessed the appointment of governors from the
metropolitan European capitals sent to rule over Africans. These governors were
either military officers or career public servants, who had little or no regard
for African tradition and values, political or cultural. The officials brought
with them their agents of oppression and subordination, the colonial army and
police who, according to Fanon, “speak the language of pure force.” Colonial
governors and administrators were allowed wide powers to administer colonial
subjects on behalf of their home governments. They were empowered to use all
necessary means to “tame” and bring the “savages” under control. This meant
issuing arbitrary ordinances without consultation. Since the colonial
administrators “owed their loyalty to those who appointed them, they became
very dictatorial, ruling by decree and incarcerating Africans without due
process of the law.”
With
this system of imported governors with absolute powers, the existing indigenous
democratic values, such as those reviewed in this study, were undermined and
replaced with the dictatorship of the colonial governors. As Basil Davidson
observed, European colonial officers ruled by decrees “administered by an
authoritarian bureaucracy to which any thought of people’s participation was
damnable subversion.” Whenever it suited them, the governors would create and
impose chiefs with new, even if insignificant, powers over societies that never
experienced chiefly autocracy. This sort of arbitrary action by colonial
officials disrupted the political traditions of Africans, resulting in protests
and riots among many groups as the Aba Women’s Riot of 1929 in Igboland
demonstrated. The common denominator was the non-representation of Africans in
the decision-making process. African chiefs who were co-opted into the colonial
administration became “errand boys” for European officials. Later, when
colonial governments began to employ the concept of legislative council,
individual persons, mostly chiefs, were appointed as representatives for their
various peoples while African educated elites were shunned. This practice was a
violation of the ideals of representative democracy as practiced in Europe,
America, and Africa.
As
the movements for independence mounted in the years immediately following the
end of World War II, European colonizers began to place more emphasis on
democracy, multiparty politics, and free market or capitalist economies.
Participatory and representative politics (democracy) were no longer an
anathema. The reasons for this shift in attitude and policy remain unclear;
however, there is little doubt that the communist challenge and neocolonialism
were crucial. As a bulwark against communist inroads, Western powers began to
promote multiparty politics, elections, rule of law, and market economy in
their African territories; and the impending independence created the need for
a “new deal” to retain Africans as allies in the event of decolonization. Too
little, too late!
Unfortunately,
the dictatorship and wanton brutality of the colonial governors was adopted by
African nationalists and later imitated by African postindependence leaders
such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Kenneth Kaunda of
Zambia, and Arap Moi of Kenya. Like colonial governors, these leaders became
very high-handed and viewed almost all forms of criticism and opposition
against their policies as treason. They curtailed freedom of expression and
imprisoned political rivals on flimsy grounds. Richard Sklar describes Moi’s
predecessor, Jomo Kenyatta, as “one of a number of African presidents who have
ruled beyond the reach of accountability.” This tradition of personal rule or
what Ayittey describes as “sultanism” became prevalent among African
postindependence leaders. Thus, the fundamental principle of African
traditional government, “that is, rule by consent of the ruled was all but
destroyed by the imposition of colonial rule and was cynically distorted and
mangled when the one-party state allowed the emergence of ambitious, corrupt,
and dictatorial African leaders, many in military uniform, after
independence.”56 For Basil Davidson, therefore, African states “inherited the
dictatorship and not the democracy, and anyone who thought it wasn’t so had better
have his head examined.”
Impulses for Democracy
The
industrialized countries of the West have not faced the democratization project
in Africa with any sense of consistency. While European colonial rule wrought
the stifling of the indigenous democracies in Africa, the decolonization
process and the attendant neocolonialism called for democratization despite the
complicity of the West in supporting African dictators during the Cold War
conflict. Similarly, the tensions of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the new era of globalization—all gave new impetus to democracy and democratization.
Yet the problem with this new push is that the type of democracy proposed and,
sometimes, foisted on Africans is the rigid, Western hegemonic version of it.
In addition, the underlying assumption in this new drive is that Africans had
never possessed or experienced democratic ideas and governments.
As
postwar nationalist pressures in Africa and the aftermath of the war in Europe
made European powers more aware of the need to prepare for the decolonization
of their African colonies, they began to forge a new type of relationship that
would help them maintain their influence in Africa, indirectly, in the event of
actual independence. This was what became known as neocolonialism, “a
many-sided attempt by outside powers to tie the new nations closely to the
interests and needs of those outside powers.” In any case, this new
relationship of indirect influence or control called for the radical
socioeconomic and political transformation of the institutions of the colonial
peoples in accordance with those of the departing colonizers. On this core
Western-style democracy, capitalism, and democratization became a sine qua non
on the eve of independence.
Although
the United States was never an active colonial power in Africa—except for its
informal influence in Liberia, it became increasingly active in the post–World
War II era. In the first place, it was the desire of the American multinational
or transnational companies to operate in a decolonized Africa, free of colonial
monopolies replete with tariffs and custom restrictions. Dominant business
interests led by American transnational corporations and capitalism, as
Davidson observed, “saw that political control of a direct kind, colonial
control, was no longer useful to, but could often be an obstruction to, the
continued extraction of wealth from Africa.” However, it had become clear to
the Unites States that for Western capitalism to thrive in Africa,
decolonization and democracy must be the necessary corollary. Secondly, the
exigencies of the Cold War dictated that Africa would soon be a battleground
for the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Although
Africa is hardly a major actor in world politics, “the continent has been
largely affected by the interests and ambitions of external powers.” For the
United States, impending African independence posed the challenge of how to
retain the former European colonies within the Western sphere of influence.
Consequently, it acted promptly to contain Soviet incursions by urging European
powers to make political concessions to African nationalists and promote
constitutional developments that would install Western democracy in Africa.
This was the beginning of the United States’ involvement in political
transformation in Africa that led to independence. However, the West,
especially the United States, paid only lip service to its democratic ideas by
supporting sycophants and psychopaths against democratically elected leaders,
as the case of Mobutu against Patrice Lumumba in the Congo and Jonas Savimbi
against Eduardo dos Santos in Angola demonstrated. As Ayittey puts it, “The
West stood by and watched as wily autocrats honed their skills to beat back the
democratic challenge.” Clearly, the ideological interests of the West, both
during the era of decolonization and thereafter, dictated its efforts in
“promoting” democracy in Africa between 1945 and 1990. The former U.S.
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, succinctly observed that “during the
long Cold War period, policies towards Africa were often determined not by how
they affected Africa, but by whether they brought advantage to Washington or
Moscow.”
The
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created a unipolar
world under which the value of Africa was greatly diminished. According to
Samuel Decalo, “What literally transpired was a massive devaluation in the
‘worth’ of Africa. African states were transformed from Cold War pawns, into
irrelevant international clutter.” African states that depended on Soviet
financial and military assistance began to collapse as their patron (USSR)
withdrew its support. Worse still, a drastic fall in commodity prices further
reduced the viability of most African states as they turned to the IMF and
World Bank for funds. As a result, “simultaneous with the increased domestic
pressures for change, and the new global balance of power, came powerful
international demands for ‘better governance’ (an end to corruption), more
democratization (civic and human rights), and ultimately, a free economy.” International
donor fatigue set in. In conjunction with the United States and France, the
World Bank and IMF began to demand political change (democratization) as a
condition for further loans to Africa.
Discernible
in all this is the dialectic between African autonomy and external
interventionism. Since the successful European exploration of Africa in the
fifteenth century, which inaugurated the ignoble slave trade and ultimately
foisted colonialism on the continent, and even after, Africans have rarely exercised
any real freedom of action. Most efforts in the direction of independence of
thought and action have been frustrated by the frequent intervention of the
Western powers in pursuit of their own agendas. Africa’s vital interests are
usually subordinated to those of the West, as is now the case in this new era
of globalization. Democracy and democratization now constitute an important
part of the spread of Western values and hence Western dominance throughout the
world. Since the demise of the Cold War in 1989, there is the feeling in the
Western mind that “the formal political institutions of the new (dis)order are
yet to be realized” and global capitalism “requires closer management if crisis
is to be avoided.” To manage global capitalism, therefore, democracy and
democratization became essential agents pursued in total disregard for African
indigenous political culture and tradition.
Globalization
has become a new feature in Africa’s relations with the West, defined in
economic terms as the various processes that are promoting increased integration
of the world economy. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as
well as most mainstream economists believe that the integration of
international economy “represents opportunities for Africa that have to be
aggressively pursued.” Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner argued that “the current
round of ‘globalization promises to lead to economic convergence for the
[developing] countries that join the system.’” As the industrialized countries
of the West view it, democratization and integration into the world economy are
mutually reinforcing.
Nevertheless,
this optimism is lopsided because it is mostly in vogue among Western
commentators. In reality, pursuing economic and political liberalization
concurrently makes both almost unachievable. For most Africanist scholars, the
implication of globalization “is that low-income African economies are too
vulnerable to benefit from generalized exposure to international market
forces.” Globalization must be seen as a new wave of imperialism imposed on the
developing countries by the more industrialized countries. In this push toward
globalization, it is appreciated that the new global world would benefit the
industrialized world more than the developing countries of Africa, especially
in harnessing and exploiting global human and material resources. Firms from
the industrialized countries would easily locate or relocate where wages are
low and unions weak. Claude Ake has argued that the emerging global economic
forces would undermine the sovereignty of African governments over economic
matters, which would in turn make democracy irrelevant. However, globalization
is not a recent phenomenon as such because much of the international economy
has been integrated since the nineteenth century. Yet, there exists the paradox
of Africa’s integration into the world economy even as the continent was
becoming increasingly marginal to the outside world. It is still open to
conceptual and empirical debate how much Africa has as yet been integrated into
the global economy. After all, the last two decades witnessed the disengagement
of global capital from much of Africa in spite of the democratization efforts
by African leaders. Thus Michel-Rolph Trouillot was right in affirming that “while
global flows increase in speed and velocity, most human beings continue to
think and act locally.”
Conclusion
Undoubtedly
democracy is a vague and confusing concept misused and abused in relation to
Africa. What is usually considered in the West as the democratization of Africa
may well be a “redemocratization” process in which Africans should evoke or
draw from their indigenous political traditions replete with democratic ideals.
Inherent in precolonial African traditional political systems were democratic
values and mechanisms for checks and balances that were disrupted, however, by
the consequent European colonization. The main problem with Western-sponsored
democracy and democratization is that they tend to be culturally biased and
insensitive to indigenous political initiatives. Western writers and observers
on this subject often assume that Africans were helpless bystanders in the face
of the external impetus for democratization. Indeed, Africans themselves
initiated much of the political demands and reforms in the 1990s in response
both to local and global phenomena. Yet neither Africa’s indigenous democratic
values nor pressures exerted by Africans for democratic reforms receive any
recognition.
Western
efforts in African democratization seem to be all about hegemony and the spread
of Western culture as part of globalization. It is sustained by a brand of
cultural arrogance that in the nineteenth century also supported scientific
racism and European imperialism. After all, in principle and practice, since
the time of the ancient Greeks, democracy has never meant the same thing to all
peoples at all times. Europe and America have had variants of democracy, and
they have usually tolerated or celebrated those political differences. Is it
possible for Africa to forge ahead with its own brand of democracy devoid of
outside prescription and intervention? Granted that Africans do not live in
complete isolation, would it not yield better dividends if African countries
were allowed to “re-democratize” based on their cultural norms and political
traditions? Is it possible, in the face of the realities of the new world
(dis)order anchored on globalization, pressures from the donors’ agencies (the
international financial institutions), and the reawakening of the stereotypic
view of African cultures and societies? Not surprisingly, Zeleza argues, “the
future does not belong to democratic models imported from outside, but to those
rooted in African traditions . . . traditions of struggle, not false harmonies,
traditions that celebrate Africa’s diversities, rather than its imaginary
uniformities.” Since Africa is not isolated from global phenomena, perhaps, a
more viable and sustainable solution to the problem of democracy and
democratization in the continent, as Basil Davidson contends, would lie in
forging a new workable synthesis that derives “firmly from the African past,
yet fully accepts the challenges of the African present.”
References
Samuel
M. Makinda, “Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Africa,” Journal of Modern
African Studies 34, no. 4 (1996): 562 and George B. N. Ayittey, “Prepared
Statement,” Democracy in Africa: The New Generation of African Leaders, U.S.
House Sub-Committee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, March 12, 1998, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office), 20–21.
Francis
Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, 16 (1989): 3–18, as cited in
Randall Schweller, “Democracy and the Post–Cold War Era,” in The New World
Order: Contrasting Theories, ed. Birthe Hansen and Bertel Heurlin (London:
Macmillan, 2000), 46.
Jean-François
Bayart, et al., The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1999), 2–3; Bessie House-Soremekun, “Democratization
Movements in Africa,” in Africa, vol. 5, Contemporary Africa, ed. Toyin Falola
(Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2003), 320; and Yohannes Woldermariam,
“Democracy in Africa: Does It Have a Chance?” in Comparative Democracy and
Democratization, ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt, 2002), 144.
Paul
Tiyambe Zeleza, “The Democratic Transition in Africa and the Anglophone
Writer,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 28, no. 3 (1994): 476.
Richard
Joseph, “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical
Perspectives,” Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (1997): 373.
Rudyard
Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” McClure’s 12, no. 4 (1899): 290–91, as
reprinted in Dennis Sherman, Western Civilization: Sources, Images, and
Interpretations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), 271–72. See also Richard
Fredland, Understanding Africa: A Political Economy Perspective(Chicago:
Burnham, 2001), 141–42.
Vivian
Lowery Derryck, “Testimony on Democracy in Africa, 1989–1999: Progress,
Problems, and Prospects,” in U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing before the
Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 3; see also 38–47.
George
B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), 90–92. Apart
from undermining the existing democracy, Boahen argues that colonialism
completely “isolated and insulated Africa” from global affairs and monumental
changes. The loss of sovereignty and the consequent isolation of Africa from
the outside world constitutes “one of the most pernicious impacts of
colonialism on Africa and one of the fundamental causes of its underdevelopment
and technological backwardness.” See Adu Boahen, African Perspectives on
Colonialism (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987), 99–100.
Jackson
Spielvogel, Western Civilization: A Brief History (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth,
1999), 87. See also Albert M. Craig, et al., The Heritage of World
Civilizations, combined 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000),
136–39.
David
Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press), 5; Martin Bernal, Black
Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, vol. 1 (London: Free
Association, 1987); and Patricia Springborg, Western Republicanism and the
Oriental Prince (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 1992).
Makinda,
“Democracy and Multi-Party Politics in Africa,” 556.
Richard
Sandbrook, “Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist-Revisionist Perspective,”
Canadian Journal of African Studies 22, no. 2 (1988): 244.
Joseph,
“Democratization in Africa after 1989,” 365.
David
G. Maillu, African Indigenous Political Ideology: African Cultural
Interpretation of Democracy (Nairobi, Kenya: Maillu, 1997), 255.
Robert
Dahl, “Justifying Democracy,” Transaction Social Science and Modern Society 32,
no. 3 (1995): 46.
Adam
Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), 13. See also
Robert Fatton Jr., “Africa in the Age of Democratization: The Civic Limitations
of Civil Society,” African Studies Review 38, no. 2 (1995): 81.
Also check with the following:
For
a survey of precolonial African political systems and organization, see George
P. Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1959); M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., African Political
Systems (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1940); and Lucy Mair, African Societies
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974).
Fortes
and Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems, 12–13. Africans recognize as
clearly as Europeans do that power corrupts and men are likely to abuse it and
so they ensure that when this occurs, measures are calculated to check it. See
Maxwell Owusu, “Domesticating Democracy: Culture, Civil Society, and
Constitutionalism in Africa,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 19,
no. 1 (1997): 135–36.
Apollos
O. Nwauwa, “The Legacies of Colonialism and the Politics of the Cold War” in
Africa, vol. 5, Modern Africa, ed. Toyin Falola (Durham: Carolina Academic
Press, 2003), 15. See also Robert Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World
(Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 44. However, through exposure to Western
culture and higher education, for good or evil, African elites acquired some
knowledge of democratic institutions.
Nicholas
Van de Walle, “Globalization and African Democracy,” in State, Conflict, and
Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1999),
96.
Claude
Ake, “Globalization, Multilateralism, and the Shrinking Democratic Space,” in
Future Multilateralism: The Political and Social Framework, ed. Michael
Schecter (New York: Macmillan, 1998), as cited in Van de Walle, “Globalization
and Democracy,” 96.
Michel-Rolph
Trouillot, “The Perspective of the World: Globalization Then and Now,” in
Beyond Dichotomies: Histories, Identities, Cultures, and the Challenge of
Globalization, ed. Elizabeth Mudimbe-Boyi (New York: State Univ. of New York, 2002),
14.
Basil
Davidson, “Questions about Nationalism,” African Affairs 76, no. 302 (1977):
44. See also Maxwell Owusu, “Democracy and Africa: A View from the Village,”
Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 3 (1992): 378
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