AT DAR ES SALAAM
(CORAM:
SAMATTA, C.J., MROSO, J.A. AND MUNUO, J.A.)
CRIMINAL
APPEAL NO. 23 OF 1999
BETWEEN
JUMU
CHOROKO…………………………………..APPELLANT
AND
THE
REPUBLIC……………………..…………….RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the decision of the High Court
of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam )
(Mr. Kajeri, - PRM – Extended Jurisdiction)
dated
1st day of September, 1995
in
High
Court Criminal Appeal No. 68 of 1995
J U D G E M E N T
=========================
MUNUO, J. A.:
The appellant Jumu Choroko was in
Criminal Case No. 554 of 1993 in the District Court at Ilala in Dar es Salaam Region,
charged with the then offence of defilement of a girl under the age of fourteen years c/s 136 of
the Penal Code, Cap 16 of the Revised Laws of Tanzania. It was alleged that on the 2nd day
of November, 1993 at about 18.00 hours at Kipawa area in Ilala District the
accused had carnal knowledge of Agnes Lyema, a girl of nine years. He was convicted and sentenced to 20 years
imprisonment. Aggrieved, the accused
unsuccessfully lodged Criminal Appeal No. 68 of 1993 in the High Court at Dar es Salaam . Subsequently, the accused brought the present
appeal to challenge the conviction. The
appellant was unrepresented. The
Republic was represented by Miss Malecela, learned State Attorney.
The
then nine year old Agnes Lyema testified as P. W. 1. She stated that on her way home she
encountered the accused who lived in the neighbourhood and whom she knew before
because she had previously sold some empty tins to him. The accused admitted the same in his
defence. It was the small girl’s
evidence that the appellant grabbed and threatened to harm her, if she cried
out. She said the appellant took her to
his room and raped her. Later some two
women namely P. W. 2 Mwanzoni Athumani and P. W. 4 Mwanahawa Shabani ordered
the appellant to release the victim whom they took to the CCM office where her
mother, P. W. 3 Flora Raphael, and her father, P. W. 5 Titus Lyema, found
her. They took her to the police. The latter issued a PF. 3 to her for medical
examination. The PF. 3, Exhibit P.1, shows that the victim had:
“Swollen oedemaline.
Laceration in the vulva.
Bleeding. Spermatozoatt R/O HIV
in the concerned man.”
Thereafter
the appellant was charged with the defilement of the small girl, Agnes Lyema.
The appellant categorically denied the
charged offence. He claimed that the
charge was fabricated by his enstranged lover, the sister of P. W. 2 Mwanzoni
Athumani who had threatened to fix him.
In the present appeal the appellant
complained that the trial court denied him his right to call the doctor who
examined the victim so that he would cross-examine him on the findings endorsed
on the PF. 3. Miss Malecela Learned State
Attorney, onceded that the trial court’s omission to inform the appellant of
his right to require the attendance of the medical doctor as stipulated under
Section 240(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 could have prejudiced the
rights of the appellant. The Republic
nonetheless maintained that the circumstances of the case plus the testimonies
of the two women, P. W. 2 and P. W. 3, who retrieved the complainant from the
room of the appellant fully supported the conviction.
In the second ground of appeal the
appellant faulted the learned trial Senior Resident Magistrate at the material
time for erroneously convicting him on the evidence of a child of tender years
without complying with the provisions of Section 127(3) of the Evidence Act. He further criticized the learned trial
magistrate for acting on the evidence of family members who are likely to be
biased to his disfavour.
The Learned State Attorney correctly
observed that in law, the evidence of family members is acceptable because
where only family members witness an event, they shall be the relevant
witnesses for they eye witnessed the matter.
Miss Malecela cited the decision in the case of Ethiyo Yombelo versus
Republic Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1995 Court of Appeal of Tanzania at
Mbeya [unreported] wherein the concept of family members evidence
sustaining a conviction was affirmed and applied. The testimonies of family members can ground
a conviction because those are the relevant witnesses where crime occurs in the
family, and in those circumstances, in the absence of independent witnesses.
At the commencement of the hearing of
the appeal the Learned State Attorney raised a preliminary objection to the
effect that the appeal is time barred because the appellant did not file his
memorandum of appeal within fourteen days as required under Rule 65(1) of the
Court of Appeal Rules, 1979. On this the
appellant countered that he did promptly ask the prison officer to file the
memo of appeal for him but would not know if the said prison officer delayed
the memorandum of appeal.
We noted that the appellant is protected
by Rule 68(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1979 which provides;
“68. (1) If
the appellant is in prison, he shall be deemed to have complied with the
requirements of Rules 61, 65, 66 and 67 or of any of them if he gives to the
officer in charge of the prison in which he is serving sentence a written
notice of his intention to appeal and the particulars required to be included
in the memorandum of appeal or statement, pursuant to the provisions of these
Rules.”
Miss
Malecela then withdrew the preliminary objection.
We stated earlier on that the Republic onceded
that the trial court’s non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section
240(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1985 could have prejudiced the right of
the appellant to a fair trial. Section
240(3) of the CPA requires the learned trial magistrate to inform the appellant
his right to require the attendance of the medical officer (who examined the
complainant) for cross-examination:
“Section
240(3) …………The court shall inform the accused of his right to require the
person who made the report to be summoned in accordance with the provisions of
this section.”
The record shows that the trial court
did not inform the appellant the above right.
Neither were the contents of the PF. 3, Exhibit P.1, read over to the
appellant. These two omissions, it
appeared to us, could have occasioned injustice to the appellant who, the
record shows, initially objected to the admission of the complainant’s PF. 3
saying he was not present during medical examination. Indeed the appellant had no right to attend
the medical examination of the victim but he had a right to require that the
medical doctor who performed the examination be called as a witness so that he
would cross-examine him. The trial
magistrate had a duty to inform the appellant so. The omission to inform the appellant of that
right renders the PF. 3, Exhibit P.1, of little value.
The proceedings of the trial court reflect
yet another flaw: non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 127
(2) of the Evidence Act, 1967 on the necessity of conducting a voire dire test
before taking the evidence of a child of tender years. Section 127(2) of the Evidence Act No. 6 of
1967 provides”
“127
(2) Where in any criminal cause or
matter any child of tender years called as a witness does not, in the opinion
of the court, understand the nature of an oath, his evidence may be received,
though not given upon oath or affirmation.
If in the opinion of the court, to be recorded in the proceedings, he is
possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of his evidence,
and understand the duty of speaking the truth.”
The brief voire dire test at Page 4 of
the Appeal record reads:
“VOIRE DIRE TEST.
I am in standard one.
I do not know what an oath
means. I am yet
to start religious classes. If you
lie it is a sin before God.”
These few
sentences are barely sufficient to establish whether the child, victim of
defilement by the appellant, had sufficient intelligence to testify and, or,
whether the said child understood the duty to tell the truth. She did state that lying is a sin. The learned trial Senior Resident Magistrate
ought to have conducted a proper voire dire test to establish that the
complainant possessed sufficient intelligence to testify and, or, that she knew
that she had an obligation to tell the truth.
The above procedural irregularities
aside, we considered the burden of proof on the part of the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. We observed that the credibility of the
complainant was dented by the testimony of her mother, P. W. 3 Flora Raphael,
who claimed that her daughter had not been defiled at any other time. Contrary to P. W. 3`s assertion, her daughter
stated at Page 5 of the appeal record:
“… The first time you did it to me I reported to my
mother who told me that I was a liar.
But the second time was when she decided to take me to the CCM office…”
which
words, in our view, show that P. W. 3 was aware that her daughter had been
defiled at some other time previously.
Another discrepancy arises in the
evidence of P. W. 2, Mwanzoni Athumani, who fished out the victim from the
appellant’s room after the defilement and yet stated at Page 8 of the appeal
record:
“she (victim) appeared normal…”
which
implied that the little girl had not been sexually assaulted. The father of the complainant saw the latter
at the CCM office and like P. W. 2 said his daughter appeared normal:
“At the CCM office I found my daughter in
normal composure.”
In view of the material discrepancies in
the prosecution evidence and the irregularities pertaining to non-compliance
with mandatory statutory provisions enumerated above, we refrain from upholding
the conviction. For those reasons the
appeal has merit. We accordingly quash
the conviction and set aside the sentence.
The appellant be released from prison forthwith unless he is otherwise detained
for other lawful cause.
Dated at Dar es Salaam this 17th day of
December, 2002.
B. A. SAMATTA
CHIEF JUSTICE
J. A. MROSO
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
E. N. MUNUO
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I certify that this is a true copy of
the original.
F. L. K. WAMBALI
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
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