ALI ABDALLAH RAJAB v SAADA ABDALLAH RAJAB AND OTHERS 1994 TLR 132 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Zanzibar F
Judge Ramadhani JJA, Mnzavas JJA and Mfalila JJA
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 42 of 1993
13 May, 1994 G
(From the judgment and decree of High Court of Zanzibar at Zanzibar, Mmila,
RM/Extended Jurisdiction).
Flynote
H Evidence - Evidence of a spouse - Failure to warn oneself on evidence from a
spouse.
Evidence - Credibility of - Witnesses - Whether appellate court can assess credibility
of witnesses
-Headnote
The appellant appealed against the decision of the High Court of Zanzibar contending
that it was wrong in believing the testimony of the first I
1994 TLR p133
respondent without taking into account that she was an interested party in the suit,
A and that it failed to warn itself that her testimony could be biased in favour of the
second respondent, her husband.
Held:
(i) Where a case is essentially one of fact, in the absence of any indication
that the trial court failed to take some material point or circumstance into account, it
is improper for the appellate court to say that the trial court has come to an erroneous
conclusion; B
(ii) Where the decision of a case is wholly based on the credibility of the
witnesses then it is the trial court which is better placed to assess their credibility
than an appellate court which merely reads the transcript of the record. C
Case Information
Appeal dismissed.
No case referred.
Mbwezeleni, for appellant.
[zJDz]Judgment
Mnzavas, JA, delivered the following considered judgment of the Court. D
This is an appeal against the decision of Mmila, Regional Magistrate, (Extended
Jurisdiction), which adjudged the second respondent, Mohamed Burhan Mkelle, the
owner of a house build on Plot No 18/25 at Kisima Majongoo area in Zanzibar
township. E
In his memorandum of appeal, the appellant, Ali Abdulla Rajab, argued that the Trial
Magistrate (Ext Jurisdiction) erred in law in assuming that Plot No 18/25 is the same
as Plot No 18/26A and thereby holding against him. F
Secondly, it is alleged that the trial court was wrong in believing the testimony of the
first respondent, Saada Abdulla Rajab without taking into account that she was an
interested party in the suit. In the third ground the appellant alleged that, and we
quote: G
`The learned trial Regional Magistrate erred in law in concluding that the
physical change of the suit premises must of necessity be caused by demolition and
nothing else'.
Finally the fourth ground of appeal was that the trial court erred in law in concluding
H that `undertaking efforts to build a house belonging to ones in law confers one the
right of ownership'.
Before we proceed further we would like to mention that when the appeal came up
for hearing the first, second and the fourth appellants did not appear despite the fact
that they were duly served with notices of hearing. Mr Mbwezeleni, learned Counsel
I
1994 TLR p134
MNZAVAS JA
A for the appellant applied for leave to be heard ex-parte and was allowed to
proceed under Rule 105(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules in respect of the first, second
and fourth appellants.
Elaborating on the grounds of appeal the learned Counsel argued that the learned
Trial Magistrate (Ext Juridiction) failed to warn himself when assessing the evidence
of Saada, the first respondent, that her testimony could be biased in B favour of the
second respondent who is her husband. It was Mr Mbwezeleni's argument that the
trial magistrate's decision was not supported by the evidence before him and asked
the Court to set aside that judgment and declare the appellant and his sister, first
respondent, the owners of the disputed premises. C
In rebuttal the third respondent, Ahmed Suleiman, who bought the disputed house
from the second respondent told the Court that the house the appellant claims to be
his property had been demolished by municipal authorities as it had become
dilapidated; and that after its demolition the second respondent erected a new D
house on the plot which house he later sold to him; third respondent.
In this appeal the following matters were not in controversy:
One, Mwanabaraka d/o Salim owned a house - No 18/25 at Kisima-Majongoo.
Mwanambaraka died in 1944 and her house was inherited by her daughter one, E
Bimkubwa Ali. Four years later, in 1948, Bimkubwa met her death and the house was
inherited by her two children, the first respondent and the appellant. The first
respondent, Saada, is married to the second respondent, Mohamed Burhan Mkelle. F
The issue that the trial court had to decide was whether the house bought by the
third respondent from the second respondent was the same house inherited by the
appellant and the first respondent after the death of their mother as alleged by the
appellant; or whether it was a brand new house built by the second respondent G
after the house inherited by the appellant and his sister, the first respondent, had
been demolished by municipal authorities as argued by the second respondent.
In his evidence before the Court of first instance the appellant argued that the
disputed house was the same house he and his sister, first respondent, inherited H
from their mother. It was his testimony that while he was in Nairobi he entrusted the
house to his sister to look after it and that he used to repair the house. He also told the
Court that on one occasion he gave his brother-in-law, the second respondent, Shs
3000/= to effect repairs on the house. It was his evidence that the house looked new
because of repairs on it and I
1994 TLR p135
MNZAVAS JA
not because a new house had been built on the plot as alleged by the second A
respondent.
In her defence the first defendant denied that the appellant had entrusted the house
to her. According to her defence the house the appellant claimed was demolished by
the Government because it was in bad shape. B
The second respondent told the Trial Court that after the house which belonged to
the appellant had been demolished by the government he applied for a building
permit to build a house on the vacant plot. He was issued with a permit and built the
house in his name and that it is this house the appellant is claiming to be his property.
He denied receiving Shs 3000/= from the appellant for repair of his house. C
According to his defence the appellant was always in financial difficulties and that on
one occasion he had to find him a job with Rex Hotel in Dar es Salaam. It was also his
defence that on another occasion he advanced the appellant capital to enable him to
start business as a fish-monger. D
In assessing the evidence the learned Trial Magistrate said on page two of the typed
script of the judgment inter alia: E
`However, taking the whole evidence into consideration this Court is of a
clear view that the assertion of the plaintiff that the house was never demolished
cannot stand. Two of his witnesses PW1 and PW2 all ended up conceding that the
previous premises were demolished. PW1 Ramadhani Juma, . . . admitted when crossexamined
by the attorney of the third defendant that the current house in that place
is a modern house, roofed with iron-sheets. He also admitted that all the walls were
physically pulled down and replaced by new ones, and that work was undertaken by
Mohamed Burhan Mkelle'. F
The learned magistrate also believed the evidence of PW2, Sheha Hadji Ali who G
said that document No 1010/1955 dated 14 June 1955 came from his office, the
municipal office; and that it showed that the previous premises which stood on Plot
No 18/25 was demolished. From the evidence of this witness the document No 7/59
dated 10 January 1959 showed that the plot was cleared and that there was no house
on the plot. H
The Trial Magistrate also believed the second respondent when he said the plaintiff
did not give him any money for repair of his (appellant's) house. The decision of this
case was wholly based on the credibility of the witnesses. The learned Trial
Magistrate saw and heard the witnesses as they testified. He was therefore in a I
1994 TLR p136
A better position to assess their credibility than this Court which merely reads the
transcript of the record.
This Court has repeatedly held that where a case is essentially one of fact, in the
absence of any indication that the Trial Magistrate/Judge has failed to take some
material point or circumstance into account, it is improper for the Court to say that
he has come to an erroneous conclusion. B
With respect to Mr Mbwezeleni, learned Counsel for the appellant, the
preponderance of probabilities heavily weighed against the appellant. We see no good
reason to differ with the finding of the trial court, based as it was, on the credibility of
the witnesses. C
In the event the appeal is dismissed.
The respondents to have their costs.
1994 TLR p136
E
0 Comments
PLACE YOUR COMMENT HERE
WARNING: DO NOT USE ABUSIVE LANGUAGE BECAUSE IT IS AGAINST THE LAW.
THE COMMENTS OF OUR READERS IS NOT OUR RESPONSIBILITY.