Nuru and another v. R. Crim. App. 528/9-M-70; 28/12/70; Mnzavas Ag. J.

 Nuru and another v. R. Crim. App. 528/9-M-70; 28/12/70; Mnzavas Ag. J.

The appellants were charged with an convicted of unlawful entry in a National Park without permit and illegal possession of a weapons within the National Park without permit c/ss 14(1), 21(1) and 16(3) (4) of the National Park Ordinance, Cap. 412, and were sentenced to 9 and 12 months concurrent sentence. When facts were stated by the prosecution, the first appellant said: “I agree with the facts but I did not see the ridge made by the tractor,” and the second appellant said: “I agree with the fact but we were not one mile inside the National Park. Moreover there is no ridge there. There is only the road boundary. We were shown only the road as the boundary.” The Republic argued that although the pleas of the appellants to the charges were equivocal, the defect was cured by the facts which constituted the offences to which both appellants admitted as five, and also that even if the appellants did not know that they were in a National Park, they could not be excused from liability because the law under which they were charged created strict liability.

            Held: (1) “From the above replies it is clear that although both appellants admitted that they entered the National Park they are both also saying that they were inside the park because they did not know it was a National Park as there was no boundary separating

the National Park from normal land. This being the position the equivocal pleas insofar as entering National Park (count one) is concerned cannot be said to have been remedied by the facts.” As for the second count, that of illegal possession of weapons. – (The accused were in possession of “pangas”) it would appear that the appellants do not qualify their admission to the facts in any way and as such I can only say that hey were rightly convicted on their own plea of guilty on this count.” (2) “It has been contended that Cap. 412 is aimed at the preservation of wild life from illegal hunting and other illegal activities in national parks and that if it were necessary to prove mens rea it would be difficult or impossible to give effect to the provisions of the Ordinance. I have no quarrel with the above line of argument but it must be remembered that cap. 412 is a penal enactment and as such we are bound to construe its provisions strictly. [Citing HERRAS vs. DE RUTZE (1995) 1 Q. B. 918 NICHOLAS v. HALL [187] L. R. 8 C. P. 322) and LION CHIN AIK v. THE QUEEN [1963] 2 W. L. R. 42.] (3) “In the present case it does not appear to me that the wording of National Parks Ordinance displaced the presumption that mens re is a necessary ingredient before an accused is convicted of an offence under the Ordinance.” (4) Conviction on count one quashed.