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Edward Mponzi v. R., Crim. App. 78-A-68, 3/8/68, Platt J.



Edward Mponzi v. R., Crim. App. 78-A-68, 3/8/68, Platt J.

Accused was convicted on twenty-four counts of forgery and one count of theft by public servant [P.C. ss. 337, 270, 265]. As a counter clerk in charge of overseas telegrams for the East African Posts and Telecommunications Administration in Arusha, he allegedly failed to properly charged or properly account for a number of telegrams. In some cases, he had altered duplicate receipts, so that they showed a lesser charge than that shown in the original; in others, he had made false entries in summary sheets to indicate that he had received less money than he had actually received. During the trial, the Postmaster identified the accused ’s handwriting on various documents, although there was no

Direct showing that he knew the accused ’s handwriting, but it was not clearly indicated in his judgment what corroboration, if any, he had relied upon to support his comparisons of the available samples.

            Held: (1) Under the East African Posts and Telecommunications Act of 1951, section 104(4), officers of the Administration are deemed, for purposes of the Penal Codes of the “territories”, to be employed in the public service thereof. The charge of theft by public servant was therefore proper. (2) “(M)erely to tell a lie in writing is not forgery. The writing must tell a lie about itself, (must purport) to be something which it is not.” The alteration of duplicate receipts was forgery, for “these duplicates purported to show that a different transaction had taken place than really had in fact.” However, the making of false entries in the summary sheets, purporting to show that accused had received less money than he had actually received, was not forgery as defined in section 333 of the Penal Code, but fraudulent false accounting contrary to section 317. (3) Under section 49 of the Evidence Act, 1967, the magistrate would have been entitled to accept the opinion of the Postmaster as to the handwriting, had the Postmaster testified that he had seen the accused write, or that he had received documents purportedly written by accused in answer to documents written by himself, or that in the ordinary course of business documents purportedly written by accused had been “habitually” submitted to him. None of these conditions was fulfilled. (4) In forming his own opinion, the magistrate is obliged to rely upon some corroboration elsewhere in the evidence; it is not clear that this was done here. However, the convictions could be upheld on counts where the offence was established by testimony of customers, as to transactions where the accused ’s handwriting was not in issue.

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