Juma v. R. Crim. App. 222-D-71; 11/8/71; Mwakasendo Ag. J.

 Juma v. R. Crim. App. 222-D-71; 11/8/71; Mwakasendo Ag. J.

The appellant was convicted of stealing goods in transit c/ss 269(c) and 265 of the Penal Code. On sentencing him, the magistrate simply remarked on the record that the allegations of eleven similar previous convictions against the appellant were “proved”, although the appellant had denied them. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. He appealed against conviction and sentence.

Held: (1) “I will in the circumstances treat eh appellant as a first offender. Before going any further, I should like to draw the attention of the Magistrate and that of the Police to the provisions of section 143 of the Criminal Procedure Code which

lays down the procedure to be followed in proving previous convictions. By virtue of section 143 the prosecutions are given the choice of three modes of proof. They may either prove: - (a) by an extract certified under the hand of the officer having the custody of the records of the court in which such conviction was had, to be a copy of the sentence or order; or (b) by a certificate signed by the officer in charge of the prison in which the punishment or any part thereof was inflicted; or (c) by production of the warrant of commitment under which the punishment was suffered. Whatever mode of proof the prosecution choose to adopt it will be necessary in each case to prove that h accused person in the dock is one and the same person as the person who is alleged to have been previously convicted. If this latter proof is not forthcoming the Court will have no alternative but o hold that the accused is a first offender. As misdirection’s on this subject are far too common, Magistrates and prosecutors alike would be well advised to adhere strictly tot e procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code. (2) “Reverting to the question of sentence. One essential factor that a trial Court has to take into consideration in determining the appropriate sentence is the intrinsic gravity of the offence it is dealing with. In the instant case there can be no question of the offence being other than a serious one. Thefts or Railway property and in particular goods in transit has reached alarming proportions, threatening the very economic viability of this public institution and of the country as a whole. The Courts would be failing in their duty if they were to sit idly by and watch while these depredations went on. As Courts would be failing in their duty if they were to sit idly by and watch while these depredations went on. As Courts of Law, I believe we cannot assist in curbing these crimes by being too lenient and too moralistic in our approach to sentencing. The public interest requires that offences which strike at our economic well-being should be vigorously dealt with and for these reasons I do not think that the appellant has been unduly punished. He has in fact got his just deserts.” (3) Appeal dismissed.