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BUNZARI MPIGUZI v LUMWECHA MASHILI 1983 TLR 354 (HC)



BUNZARI MPIGUZI v LUMWECHA MASHILI 1983 TLR 354 (HC)

Court High Court of Tanzania - Mwanza

Judge Katiti J

October 14, 1985

(PC) CIVIL APPEAL 207 OF 1982

Flynote

Land Law - Land allocation - Village Council allocated land - Whether Council has

such B power - S. 195 Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982.

Constitutional Law - Village Council reallocates land - Destruction of crops belonging

to former user - Whether user entitled to compensation from the Council - Fourth C

Constitutional Amendment 1984.

-Headnote

The village Council of Kijuka village allocated land which was already occupied and

used by the respondent to one Maduka s/o Mahushi. The latter destroyed crops

which D had been planted by the former and planted his own crops on the land.

The respondent sued the appellant in his capacity as chairman of the village council

for compensation for the destruction of his crop.

Held: (i) The new allocatee was entitled to uproot the crops he thought were not

useful E to him; it was the Village Council which caused the destruction of the

respondent's crops;

(ii) section 24 of the Fourth Constitutional Amendment Act 1984

unequivocally provides that nobody should be deprived of his property contrary to

law and without F compensation commensurate to the value of such property if such

deprivation is necessary.

Case Information

Appeal dismissed.

No cases referred to. G

[zJDz]Judgment

Katiti, J.: Lumwecha Mashili, hence to be referred to as the respondent, filed an action

in Kasenyi Primary Court Sengerema, against Bunzari Mpiguze, hence the appellant,

in his capacity as the chairman of Kijuka village, claiming Shs. 1,000/= the alleged

value of H the crops, that were allegedly destroyed, as a result of the re-allocation of

the same land he had hitherto been cultivating to one Maduka s/o Mahushi, who

uprooted the same and planted his own crops. The Primary Court gave verdict

against the respondent, arguing that after all, the appellant was not personally

involved in the I uprooting of the said crops. The respondent, dissatisfied, appealed

to the District Court which

1983 TLR p355

KATITI J

held that since it was the village authority which did allocate the land knowing fully

well A that the same land had been under use by the respondent, it must be held

liable for compensation for crops damaged as a result thereof. The District Court

upheld the respondent's claim and hence this appeal.

In the direction for disposal of this appeal, I shall first go by the undisputed and the B

unchallenged. In the year 1980, DW.3 Maduka s/o Mahushi approached the village

Council of Kijuka village for allocation of land for use and continued agricultural

purposes. The Village Council dutifully obliged, and allocated a piece of land to

DW.3. Maduka s/o Mahushi who began clearing and cultivating the same. The

respondent had C hitherto been using the same said piece of land. The respondent,

upon discovering what DW.3 Maduka s/o Mahushi was doing, became angry alleging

that his crops had been uprooted and destroyed by the donee of the same land, and so

sought Shs. 1,000/= as compensation for the same from the Village Council that

allocated the same. D Having studied the record, it does appear that while the

foundation of the claim is clear cut, the defence does seem to admit to having

allocated the same land to DW.3 although claiming at the same time that DW.3 was

not allowed to uproot the respondent's crops. And yet in the memo of appeal, the

appellant comes up with a surprise, averring that the land allocated was empty land.

To avoid narrowing my view E of the case, and with the uncontrovertible fact that

the same said piece of land was allocated to DW.3, I shall allow myself to entertain

five broad issues namely:

(1) Whether the piece of land had hitherto been under use by the

respondent. F

(2) Whether the same piece of land had been planted with crops.

(3) Whether upon allocation of the same to DW.3, such crops were

uprooted, or otherwise destroyed and,

(4) Whether the Village Government is liable to pay the compensation

claimed. G

(5) If issue (4) is positive what reliefs is the respondent entitled to, if at all?

I shall deal with the above issues seriatim. The first issue does on the record qualify

for a positive and affirmative answer without qualification, for apart from the H

generality of the evidence by the respondent, the appellant, whether unwittingly or

because of desire to tell the truth, does admit that not only had the respondent

hitherto and before been using the said shamba, but also that the said shamba had

been planted with potatoes and cassava at the time of the I allocation of the same to

DW.3, in as few words as follows:

1983 TLR p356

KATITI J

"Maduka Mahushi aling'oa viazi na mihogo yako kwa nguvu zake tu

bila kibali changu A wala Kamati ya Ugawaji".

From the above, I would prefer not to beat about the bush in the direction of

answering issue No. 1 and No. 2, for it does unequivocally appear that when the reallocation

of this piece of shamba to DW. 3 by the Village Council was done, the

appellant and B associates well knew that the respondent had been using this land

and had by then and currently planted potatoes and cassava. It does appear to me

from the above that the affirmative answers in so far as issues (1) and (2) are

concerned are as natural as are day and night. The appellant cannot be now heard to

say that the land was empty. C

Whether the potatoes and cassava crops were destroyed does quickly then arise. The

answer is not difficult to come by. I shall not go by the evidence of the respondent

personally, which in any case is that the same crops were destroyed, for that apart, D

P.W.2 Lubinza s/o Kiyeji ardently and succinctly says and I quote:

"Maduka Mahushi aling'oa mihogo ya mdai na akapanda mihogo yake". E

It could and may easily be observed that this excerpt from the evidence of PW. 2,

does not in any way differ from what the appellant said in the excerpt I have above

associated with him. From the above I find myself treading on a road and I consider

it very safe to conclude that indeed the respondent's crops were uprooted and

destroyed by DW.3, F the donee or allocatee of the same land or shamba. The third

issue does therefore qualify for an affirmative answer, which is hereby accordingly

accorded.

The respondent charges the Village/Chairman with liability to compensate him Shs.

1,000/= for the crop destruction - and hence the issue whether the Village

Government, whose Chairman is now its representative, is liable to pay such

compensation. In G attempts to solve this, I feel obliged to make concessions about

the legal reality that obtained then and is now obtaining. Under the Villages and

Ujamaa Villages (Reg. Desg. and adm.) Act No. 21 of 1975, in particular under the

provisions of section 12 of H the said Act, the Village Council in allocating land was

exercising its legal executive powers within the perimeters and boundaries of its

Village. So that it is an undisputable legal position that land allocation to Villagers in

this case fell within the bounds of such executive powers. As of now although the

Villages and Ujamaa Villagers (Registration, I Designation and Administration) Act

1975 under which the Village allocated the land has been repealed by section 195 of

the Local

1983 TLR p357

KATITI J

Government (District Authorities) Act No. 1982, the provisions of Section 12 of the

A Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, designation and administration) Act

1975, have been re-enacted with little and in-consequential variations under section

142 of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982 - retaining and

maintaining the supreme executive powers of the Village Council. B

Now to return to the relevant point, when the Village Council of Kijuka Village was

allocating the land to Maduka s/o Mahushi, it was exercising powers legally conferred

upon it by law. That may be fine. But the Village Council allocated land that was

already in use by the respondent, who as it has above been shown, had already

invested his sweat therein. And of course, Maduka s/o Mahushi, DW.3 having been

allocated land C for agricultural purposes, it was not for him to begin constituting a

commission of inquiry to establish who the owner of the land so allocated could be.

He was I think entitled to presume that the Village Council knew better that the land

in question had incumbent claimant or not. And once he was in occupation the said

Maduka Mahushi D DW.3 was entitled to make use of the land so allocated in the

fashion and manner consistent with land use. He was entitled to up-root crops he

thought were not useful to him and this he did. From the above I would confidently

conclude, that causatively it was the Village Council that led to the destruction of the

respondent's crops. E

Was the respondent to be compensated and by whom is the fourth issue. This

question I dare say is only rhetorically posed, for our jurisprudence does tenderly

nurse the concept that "all men have a right to receive" a just return for their labours

"or a just F compensation for labour rendered". See the Union Constitution of

Tanzania - Act 43/1975 then, - See also the case of Laiton Kingala v Musa Bariti

[1975] L.R.T. No. 40. And I think it is not irrelevant to add, that now vide the

provision of Section 24 of the Fourth Constitutional Amendment Act 1984, it is

articulated with emphasis and G unequivocally that nobody should be deprived of

his property contrary to law and without payment of compensation commensurate to

the value of such property if such deprivation is necessary. Although the Fourth

Constitutional amendment Act 1984, is a H recent arrival, the concept contained

therein, is as above shown not as recent an arrival as the Fourth Constitutional

Amendment. The Village Council, it is my conclusion, having deprived the

respondent of his shamba, and since admittedly the respondent had invested his sweat

and labour therein, the Village Council that causatively occasioned the destruction of

crops, has to compensate the respondent. As the quantum of compensation has not

been contested the same amount is allowed. I

1983 TLR p3587

The appeal is dismissed with costs. A

Appeal dismissed.

1983 TLR p358

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